Schools without a law: primary education in France from the Revolution to the Guizot Law by Montalbo, Adrien
HAL Id: halshs-02093546
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02093546
Preprint submitted on 9 Apr 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Schools without a law: primary education in France
from the Revolution to the Guizot Law
Adrien Montalbo
To cite this version:
Adrien Montalbo. Schools without a law: primary education in France from the Revolution to the
Guizot Law. 2019. ￿halshs-02093546￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER N° 2019 – 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schools without a law: primary education in France  
from the Revolution to the Guizot Law 
 
 
 
Adrien Montalbo 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: N33, N63 
Keywords : Primary education, Public investment, Nineteenth-century France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 80 52 16 00= 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE DES PONTS PARISTECH – ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE AGRONOMIQUE – UNIVERSITE PARIS 1 
Schools without a law: primary education in
France from the Revolution to the Guizot Law
Adrien Montalbo∗†
March 27, 2019
Abstract
The French Revolution had a substantial impact on the functioning of primary schools as it
suppressed one of their major funding sources, taxes collected by the clergy. Nonetheless,
the geographical distribution of schools and enrolment rates remained relatively stable
until late into the nineteenth century. In this article, I show that understanding the re-
organisation of primary schooling after the Revolution is essential in accounting for these
long-lasting variations in educational attainment. By using a new database at the level
of primary schools, I first show that municipalities took over the control of instruction in
areas well-endowed in economic resources and where schools were more concentrated be-
fore the revolutionary time period. Secondly, I demonstrate that, by subsidising schools,
municipal authorities acted in favour of a fall in schooling fees, lowering the average cost
of education and therefore increasing enrolment rates. Finally, I show that teaching con-
ditions were better and human capital accumulation higher in the schools provided with
municipal grants. Public investment in primary schooling is therefore a key element to un-
derstand the uneven distribution of schools, enrolment rates and knowledge accumulation
in France during the nineteenth century.
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1 Introduction
The Revolution in France constituted a considerable shock for primary schooling. Indeed, to
this date, the existence of many schools was depending on the resources collected by the clergy.
Especially north of a line going from Saint-Malo to Geneva, teachers were mostly assisting
parish priests along with their educational activities, serving as mass cantors for example. Part
of their remuneration thus came from taxes dedicated to the clergy, as the tithe. After the
Revolution, these taxes were suppressed and teachers could, from then on, only rely on tuition
fees (known as the écolage) paid by parents, and on the potential investment of municipalities
in primary schooling. If the school was financed only by fees, it was said to be private. On
the contrary, if the municipality at stake was investing in education, the school was public1.
This public investment could took several forms: paying the teacher annually, providing him
with an accommodation, a classroom or another municipal activity. In this last case, the
teacher had also to serve as town clerk or mass cantors to benefit from the municipal financial
support. This type of investment characterised small towns with low economic resources and
a few pupils attending primary schools. In this work, "school" is a synonymous to "teacher’s
presence". Indeed, in the vast majority of municipalities, no schoolhouses were actually built
to welcome teachers and pupils, even when the school was public. As a consequence, teachers
were often using their own house as a classroom. Nonetheless, I will stick to "school" to describe
the presence of a teacher for the sake of simplicity.
At the eve of the French Revolution and north of the Saint-Malo/Geneva line, around two-thirds
of men knew how to sign, with a maximum of 88% for men and 66% for women in Lorraine
[Duveau, 1957]. The respective average levels for the whole country were 47% for men, 27% for
women. South of the line, these levels were much lower as in Brittany for example where only
15% of the adult population knew how to sign. This was also true for the number of schools and
enrolment rates. For example, there were 740 816 children schooled north of the line and 375
931 south of it at the same period, while the population in the southern part was higher [Furet
and Ozouf, 1977a]. Therefore, in areas where primary schooling was more closely associated to
religious activities and financed by taxes dedicated to the clergy, the concentration of schools,
along with enrolment and literacy rates, were much higher than in the remaining parts of the
country.
Despite fierce debates during the nineteenth century to assess the effect of the Revolution on
primary schools [Allain, 1881], [Gontard, 1959]2, the geographical differences in their concentra-
tion remained stable until the Guizot Law of 1833 [Dupin, 1826], [D’Angeville, 1836], [Babeau,
1885], [Fleury and Valmary, 1957] and even until late in the nineteenth century3. North to
the Saint-Malo/Geneva line, the number of schools and enrolment rates continued to be highly
1I will sometimes use the term "subsidised" instead of public in order to avoid repetitions.
2The core point of the debate was to know if the suppression of taxes dedicated to the clergy impacted
negatively, and by how much, the presence of schools.
3This law made compulsory to open a primary school for boys in every municipality more than 500 inhab-
itants. These municipalities also had from then on to remunerate teachers annually, at least 200 francs per
year.
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superior to the ones south of this very line (except for the Rhone Valley and the Aquitaine re-
gion which were also characterised by a relatively good presence of schools). However, little has
been said, either in the historical or economic literature, to explain the strongly stable pattern
of primary instruction in France between the Revolution and the Guizot Law. Shedding lights
on this issue is of prior importance to understand the history of education in France all along
the nineteenth century. Indeed, even if a convergence already existed between departments
(counties) [Diebolt et al., 2005], the geographical differences in educational attainment were
long-lasting and perpetuated at least until the Ferry Laws of 1881-1882, which made enrolment
in primary schools mandatory for children. The main objective of this work is to evaluate how
primary schooling recomposed itself after having been deprived of one of its major source of
funding. This will help to understand how the geographical differences in education spread-
ing were maintained and even reinforced after the Revolution, and why some areas kept an
educational edge over the others until late into the nineteenth century.
Several social and economic factors that influenced positively the presence of schools have
already been identified in the literature. The extensive use of a non-written patois, as in Brit-
tany for example, was shown be have been detrimental to primary schooling [Furet and Ozouf,
1977b], as well as the average altitude of municipalities and a higher population dispersion.
Indeed, these two characteristics were often associated with poor-quality byroads and higher
travelling distances, which made the continuous attendance of children harsher [Meynier, 1970],
[Gontard, 1959]. This was influencing negatively enrolment rates and the amount of fees per-
ceived by teachers, making their presence in the municipality unstable. Economic factors were
also clearly linked to the spread of primary schooling. Many indicators as the amount of taxes
on doors and windows [D’Angeville, 1836], commercial networks proximity [Julia, 1970] or the
concentration of skilled occupations [Corbin, 1975] were associated with a stronger presence
of primary schools at the department or district level4. The same was true for industrial ac-
tivities in the second part of the century [Diebolt et al., 2017], [Franck and Galor, 2017]. A
demand and a supply-side argument explain this association. First, since families had to pay
monthly schooling fees so that they children could go to school, a higher purchasing power
was making primary schooling more affordable. Secondly, the municipalities that wanted to
invest in primary schools could also do so more easily if they were collecting great amounts of
money coming from taxes. The high concentration of primary schools and economic resources
in the north-east part of France exemplifies this relation [Lepetit, 1986], [Grew and Harrigan,
1991]. There were, however, some counter-examples, as the relatively poor mountainous area of
Briançonnais in the Hautes-Alpes department where literacy rates were among the highest in
France at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In this case, it seems that poverty and bad
weather during the long winter months, making agricultural work harsher, prompted people
into becoming teachers in the surrounding areas [Sandre and Ozouf, 1979].
All these factors account partly for the unequal involvement of families and municipalities in
4The districts indicate in this work the French administrative territorial divisions known as sous-préfectures
or arrondissements. There were between two and six of them in each department.
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primary schooling. Broadly speaking, they point out that in departments with higher economic
resources, a more concentrated population and a longer tradition of instruction outside the
family sphere, there was a higher probability to find more primary schools and larger enrol-
ment rates. However, they do not indicate how the schooling system was organised after the
Revolution and how this influenced the presence of schools, enrolment rates and the accumula-
tion of human capital. In this work, I will show that the distinction between private and public
primary schooling was essential in explaining the uneven distribution of these three phenomena
between municipalities.
To do so, I will use a newly constituted database on education at the level of districts and
municipalities. This database is extracted from a national survey launched by French Minister
of Education François Guizot in 1833, the very year he made mandatory for any municipality
over 500 inhabitants to open and maintain a primary school for boys. The survey, conducted
in every primary school of every French municipality, provides very precise information on the
characteristics of schools, teachers and municipal investment in education before the implemen-
tation of the law. I collected the data at the municipal level for 22 departments, which amounts
to 8 129 towns and villages, a primary school being located in 59.5% of them.
My contribution to the understanding of primary schooling differentiated spread at the end
of the 18th century and at least until the Guizot law is threefold. Firstly, I exhibit a positive
correlation between wealth at the level of districts and municipal investment in primary schools.
From the Revolution to the Guizot Law, municipalities were more often investing in public
schools by paying teachers on a regular basis, by providing them with an accommodation or a
classroom, ... when they were located in districts with higher economic resources. Therefore, the
stable difference between French areas in terms of primary schools concentration at that time
actually corresponded greatly to differences in public investment. Several reasons and motives
as a positive income effect, the will of local authorities to favour social mobility or ensure public
order can be thought of to explain this association. Therefore, after the Revolution, in areas
previously endowed with higher resources and primary schools, municipalities took over the
control of instruction and made it largely publicly supplied.
Secondly, I show that in these public schools, the level of schooling fees was on average lower
than in their private counterparts. This level was set freely by teachers if they were not
provided with municipal grants (therefore in private schools) but was subject to a negotiation
between them and the local authorities when a school was subsidised. Therefore, a lower level
demonstrated the will of authorities to decrease the cost of education borne by families in
exchange for grants. This contributed to increase enrolment rates as education came at a lower
cost for parents. As a consequence, public investment also accounted greatly for the differences
in enrolment rates, even after controlling by the level of economic resources.
Thirdly, thanks to the precision of the Guizot survey, I identify an association between public
primary schooling, teaching conditions and human capital accumulation. Municipalities tended
to recruit more qualified teachers for their schools, which resulted in a higher teaching quality, a
higher discipline within classrooms and more progress made by pupils. The number of subjects
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taught in these schools, along with the average number of schooling years, were also higher than
in the private ones, indicating that children were learning more. Human capital accumulation,
whether proxied by the progress of pupils or by the the number of subjects taught and schooling
years, was then higher within public schools.
Municipal investment was therefore a crucial factor in explaining the evolution of primary
schooling before the Guizot Law. In richer areas where schools were already well-spread before
the Revolution, municipalities took over the control of primary education and actively worked
on extending it. This accounted for the unequal presence of schools, the variation in enrolment
rates and in human capital accumulation. Since the legislation on primary instruction for
boys remained globally the same until the Ferry Laws of 1881-1882, the areas in which public
involvement was high kept a clear schooling edge until late into the nineteenth century [Grew
and Harrigan, 1991]. Therefore, this paper helps understanding the causes of primary schooling
differentiated spread from the Revolution to this date.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background of primary
schooling. Data is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results for what regards the
presence of schools and municipal grants while section 5 deals with the relationship between
enrolment rates and the level of schooling fees. Section 6 explores the link between public
primary schooling, teaching conditions and human capital accumulation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Historical Background
Before the Guizot Law, local initiatives were determinant in explaining primary schools’ pres-
ence and characteristics, while national legislation was often absent or ineffective. Indeed, the
first "coercing" royal decree on primary education was passed on the 13th of December 1698 un-
der King Louis XIV5. It aimed at making primary instruction mandatory but was never really
applied. From the end of the 15th century and until the French Revolution, the organisation
of primary schools was broadly divided into two models, one in the north and north-east parts
of France and the other one characterising rather the southern part of the country. The first
one can be described as ecclesiastical or parochial. Teachers were indeed paid with a part of
the tithe, as in Lorraine, or directly by the parishioners as in Normandy6. Religious founda-
tions were more actively participating to fund primary schools in the north-western area. In
each case, teachers were expected to be clerics, assisting parish priests during the mass and
to serve as cantor. In the south of France, especially in Provence, the organisation of primary
schooling was rather municipal. Teachers were recruited by local authorities by means of an
annual contract like it was the case with bakers or butchers. A negotiation with the town
council permitted to choose teachers’ wage, financed by a combination of a tax supplement on
the inhabitants of the municipality and by schooling fees, or only by the fees paid by families.
Therefore, the school could remain privately financed even if local authorities were involve in
5Followed by another in 1724.
6In both cases, they could also have benefited from corvée and taille (land tax) exemptions.
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choosing the teacher. Most of the times, no religious obligations were expected to be fulfilled
as in the northern model. Apart from these two general models, there were also other forms
of schooling organisation characterising the small or on the contrary the bigger towns. Parish
priests could take over the provision of primary instruction in small localities while in cities like
Paris or Rouen, corporations of maitres-écrivains were in theory granted with the monopoly of
teaching how to read and write7 [Lebrun et al., 2003].
This description of primary schooling mostly applied to boys. Girls were, until the Falloux
Law of 1850, left apart from the national legislation on primary schools and not supposed to be
taught along with boys. However, it was common to gather both sexes when economic resources
were too scarce to create two distinct schools8. Therefore, until late in the 19th century, numer-
ous religious congregations actually took over the schooling of girls. For example, the Ursulines
in the south-east, the Filles de Notre-Dame, the Sœurs de la Charité de l’instruction chréti-
enne or the Filles de la Visitation within the Parisian region. But for the majority of them,
no education was provided outside of the family sphere. The most prominent congregation for
boys was the Frères des écoles chrétiennes authorised in 1724, mostly present in towns, which
provided free education. There were around 1 000 frères at the time of the French Revolution,
36 000 pupils being instructed by them.
The revolutionary period and the First Republic (1789-1804) were marked by the suppression
of congregations in 1792, but no significant measure on primary education were adopted despite
numerous debates in the Assembly led by Talleyrand, Condorcet, Lakanal, ... However, the
end of the Old Regime saw the separation between primary schooling and the religious sphere.
Indeed, teachers couldn’t be paid with a share of ecclesiastical taxes any-more, which had been
suppressed. Their wages were from then on to be composed of schooling fees, municipal grants
or a combination of both.
No clear indications on how municipalities should levy funds to finance schools were formulated
until the Guizot law [Savoie, 2014]. After the passing of this law, they had to finance schooling
with a share of their own resources which could come from the four direct contributions created
during the revolutionary period9. They could also make use of resources coming from the octrois,
which corresponded to indirect taxes on products imported and sold within the delimitations of
the municipality10. Finally, municipalities could also levy additional cents for special purposes,
as instruction for example. This consisted in asking taxpayers to pay an additional given
amount of cents for any franc of tax. Departments were also contributing to the funding of
primary schools but in a very limited proportion. Indeed, it was only after the Guizot law that
7This was in practise impossible to apply.
8At the time of the passing of the Guizot Law, separated primary schools for girls were still rare. Victor
Cousin described them as "almost luxury schools" before the Chamber of Deputies in 1833.
9The Assemblée Constituante implemented in 1791 a land tax, a personal property tax on incomes coming
from other sources than land and commercial activities and a patente tax on these commercial resources. An
additional tax on the number of doors and windows of habitations was later implemented in 1798.
10These octrois had been suppressed in 1791 and progressively reintroduced from 1798 onwards. Taxes on
beverages were for example re-established in 1804, in 1806 for those on salt. They constituted a crucial source
of income for municipalities. For example, in 1913, it is estimated that one-third of the economic resources of
provincial towns were coming from these indirect taxes, half of the resources of Paris.
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municipalities had formally the right and the duty to ask for their help when they own resources
and the amounts collected through additional cents were too low to finance the schools11.
The Napoleonic period (1804-1815) saw the creation of the Université in 1806-1808 and a
focus on secondary schooling rather than primary education. Along with the preceding period,
a lack of financial means prevented national authorities from undertaking important reforms
on primary instruction [Mayeur, 2004]. The Restoration (1815-1830) was the time period of a
stronger implication of authorities. This began by an increase in the funds dedicated to primary
schooling. Also, in 1816, a new law created supervising committees at the level of cantons and
a certification of morality granted by the mayor and the parish priest. This latter was from
then on required to become a teacher. Along with this, a three-level certification of skills was
implemented. Teachers were supposed to have at least the lowest one in order to practice.
Municipalities were also compelled to provide children with primary instruction, which was
also supposed to be free for the indigents. This last measure was actually not applied12.
The two models of primary schooling which existed before the Revolution in France also cor-
responded to two unequal spread of schools. From the 16th century onwards, regions north
of the Loire river like Alsace or Normandy were well-endowed in primary schools while, in the
South-West, only one parish over five had a school. The situation didn’t evolve much during
the next century. Taking marriage signature as a proxy for literacy13, only three departments
(within their nowadays borders) north of the Saint-Malo/Geneva line exhibited a signature rate
for spouses lower than 20% whereas no more than four of them had a higher rate south of this
very line. The average national values for women and men were of 14% and 27% at that time.
In Figure 1, one may see the geographical division of French territory for what regards this
signature rate and its stability from the end of the 17th century to the Guizot law of 1833.
There has even been a reinforcement of differences in favour of the eastern regions and a relative
decline of western ones. This pattern remained stable at least until the 1860s in France, even if
a convergence in educational attainment was already at work between departments before the
Ferry Laws. The number of children schooled per 10 000 inhabitants, for example, still followed
closely the geographical distribution described in the mid-1850s and mid-1860s. The same is
true for percentage of women or men signing their marriage license in 1871-1875.14.
11The role of the state was even smaller since it is only during the Restoration that the credits dedicated to
primary schooling began to rise, from 50 000 francs to 981 000 francs between 1816 and 1832. They were doubled
in 1829 and 1830. These credits were essentially employed in buying textbooks intended to be distributed to
indigents.
12A precise description of the daily life of schools and teachers in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
can be found in [Duveau, 1957]. Analyses or testimonies on the state of primary schooling by teachers from the
early nineteenth century are available in [Lorain, 1837] and [Meunier, 1981]. In order to have an analysis of local
schooling development in the eighteenth century, see for example [Vovelle, 1975] or [Laget, 1971]. See [Gildea,
1983] for a local study from 1800 onwards for the departments of Ille-et-Vilaine, Gard and Nord. In order to have
a full political analysis and a description of the laws, projects, and debates about primary instruction during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, one can refer to [Gontard, 1959] and the second and third chapters
in [Furet and Ozouf, 1977b]. See [Nique, 1990] to have a description of educational state measures from 1815
onwards.
13Spouses and their witnesses had to sign marriage register from 1667 onwards. This is why this proxy has
been only available since the end of the 17th century.
14See Figure B1 in the Appendix.
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(37,65]
(21,37]
(14,21]
[6,14]
No data
Men marriage signature rate 1686-1690
St-Malo
Geneva
(87,100]
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(54,69]
[26,54]
No data
Percentage of municipalities with schools 1833
Figure 1: Literacy rate and primary schooling
Source: Statistique générale de la France, Guizot survey.
Note: Departments in blue are the ones for which education data are available at the level of
municipalities.
3 Data
3.1 Data on Education
The data I use in this work is coming from a national survey conducted in 1833 under the super-
vision of French Minister of Education François Guizot15. 490 inspectors were sent throughout
France in autumn 1833 to inspect all primary schools, both public and private. However, pri-
mary schools to which only girls were attending were excluded from the scope of the survey as
the Guizot law didn’t apply to them. All departments were inspected, except Corsica16.
Data coming from the Guizot Survey of 1833 was published for all French districts in a Report
to the King [Guizot, 1834]. Only some of the questions asked in the initial survey, those deemed
of major interest, were aggregated in this report. From the initial individual (at the level of
each primary school) forms, the data was collected for 22 departments and 8 129 municipali-
ties17. At least one primary school was present in 4 836 of them (59.5%). This project has been
initiated by the Service d’Histoire de l’Education of the I.N.R.P, which collected data for the
academies of Nantes, Bourges and Nîmes. Other departments were then added to this initial
database. In Figure 1, one can see that these departments (in blue) belonged to areas with very
different levels of enrolment. Collection of data was indeed conducted with the aim of catching
15A lot of information on this survey is available here : http://www.inrp.fr/she/guizot/.
16One issue with this data is that only the schools indicated as so by mayors and local authorities were
reported by the inspectors. Therefore, it doesn’t capture the intensity of familial education or the presence of
more informal classes in which a person mastering the basics of literacy was teaching a few children, like the
carpenter in [Thabault, 1993].
17These departments are: Ardèche, Ardennes, Cher, Corrèze, Côtes-du-Nord (Côtes D’Armor), Finistère,
Gard, Gers, Indre, Indre-et-Loire, Loire-Inférieure (Loire Atlantique), Loiret, Lozère, Marne, Morbihan, Nièvre,
Oise, Bas-Rhin, Saone-et-Loire, Seine-et-Marne, Deux-Sèvres and Vaucluse. At that time, there were 86 de-
partments existing and 26 academies. Current denominations of departments are specified in parenthesis when
a change occurred.
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all the determinants that underpinned primary schools’ spreading. Other data on education is
coming from the Statistique générale de la France18.
The departments selected were quite representative of France for what regards the primary
education characteristics that will be under scrutiny in this analysis. Taking average values at
the level of districts in order to compare this "municipal level sample" to the entire country
thanks to the Report to the King19 shows that the investment of municipalities in primary
education (provision of a fixed salary or an accommodation to teachers) and the number of
primary schools didn’t differ significantly between the whole population and the sample. How-
ever, enrolment rates and the percentage of municipalities with schools (60.8% against 71.5%
for France) were lower in the sample, which means that the departments at stake were less
well-endowed in primary schools than the average national level. This is why several wealth
controls along with district and department fixed effects will be introduced in the estimations
to reduce potential biases linked to time-invariant specific factors.
3.2 Data on Economic Resources
Data on economic resources is collected from different sources and at different levels of ag-
gregation. For departments, the Statistique générale de la France provides data on roads and
canals length. Information on taxes is collected from the Annuaire des contributions directes de
l’Empire français of 180520. Data on cereal production in 1815 is collected from the Archives
statistiques du Ministère des travaux publics de l’agriculture et du commerce published in 1837.
Wheat prices taken from departmental series established in Labrousse et al. [1970]. Other data
on agriculture is taken from the national Agricultural Survey of 1852 analysed in [Demonet,
1990]. The location of industrial activities and their characteristics come from the Industrial
survey conducted between 1839 and 1847 and presented in [Chanut et al., 2000]. Finally, data
on life expectancy is provided in [Bonneuil, 1997].
3.3 Demographic Data on Municipalities and Districts
Data on the population (total and the number of children and single people) of municipali-
ties and departments is taken from the Statistique générale de la France, along with religious
presence measured by the number of presbyteries. Population dispersion is taken from the
Postal Survey of 1847, along with the surface area of municipalities which have disappeared or
merged since 183321. The Institut national de l’information géographique et forestière, a public
organism in charge of the diffusion of geographic information in France, provides this data for
the other municipalities. The altitude of municipalities is also taken from this organism.
18These data can be found here https://journals.openedition.org/acrh/2890
19See Table A1 in the Appendix.
20This statistical directory provides data about the "quatre vieilles" direct taxes implemented in France after
the Revolution.
21More information on this survey is available in [Marin and Marraud, 2011].
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Data at the primary school or municipality level is displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Education Summary Statistics - Municipal and school levels
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Primary schools level
Average schooling fees (data) 96 60 8 600 2420
Average schooling fees (computed) 113 69 6 795 4092
Fixed salary 0.58 0 1 6380
Salary amount - Only when paid (francs per year) 255.99 236.72 2 3000 3737
Salary amount 148.31 221.32 0 3000 6292
Accommodation 0.47 0 1 5742
Classroom 0.55 0 1 5742
Other municipal occupation 0.47 0 1 6328
Other municipal occupation salary amount - 101.69 108.85 1 900 2695
Only when paid
Other municipal occupation salary amount 45.46 88.65 0 900 6014
Number of subjects 4.76 1.62 1 11 5715
Schooling years 4.99 1.93 1 9 5678
Municipality level
Primary school 0.59 0 1 8129
Fixed salary 0.39 0 1 8129
Salary amount 97.09 184.38 0 2400 8129
Accommodation 0.29 0 1 8129
Classroom 0.33 0 1 8129
Other municipal occupation 0.58 0 1 4651
Other municipal occupation salary amount 30.42 74.11 0 900 8129
Pupils per 100 inhabitants - Winter 9.49 6.79 0.27 61.64 4658
Source: Guizot survey.
Notes: Schooling fees are in cents of francs. In 58% of the primary schools, the teachers were provided with a fixed salary. In 39% of
municipalities, there existed a primary schools providing a fixed salary to a teacher. The average fixed salary granted was of 259 francs
per year, taking into account only the teachers paid so. This average value was of 97 francs when taking the mean of the average salary
at the municipality level, meaning that, on average, municipalities were each paying teachers 97 francs annually. In the data, there are
observations for which only the minimum and maximum fees paid by parents is specified. I took the mean of these two values to add
observations to the average schooling fees. This measure corresponds to he "computed" average schooling fees in the table.
Primary schools were located in 59% of the municipalities and 39% of them were paying teachers
a fixed annual salary. Around 30% of them were providing teachers with an accommodation
or a classroom. These figures were higher at the school level since in 58%, 47% and 55% of
the primary schools, a teacher was provided with such municipal grants respectively. Some
municipalities were therefore subsidising more than one primary school. This was only the case
in bigger towns which had the financial capacities to enhance primary schooling. The average
schooling fees paid each month by families amounted to around 1 franc.
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At the level of districts, and therefore for the entire country, the average percentage of munici-
palities with at least one primary school was around 69% in 1833. However, this measure varied
a lot since some districts had less than 20% of their municipalities endowed with schools. It is
not possible to know the percentage of public schools as this information was not aggregated.
However, there were around 57 public schools per 100 municipalities on average within each
district. Once again, some districts were characterised by a very low schooling investment of
municipalities, with less than 5 subsidised schools for 10022.
4 Municipal Investment in Primary Schooling
In this section, I exhibit a positive correlation between economic resources and public investment
in primary schooling. To do so, I use data on the heights of military conscripts to approximate
the level of economic resources. Indeed, other economic indicators for this time period are
either only available at the department level (as agricultural production for example) or too
concentrated in some areas to fully account for the economic resources of districts (as the
industrial characteristics). In France, since the Jourdan-Delbrel law of 1798, all single French
men had to accomplish a compulsory military service between 20 and 25 years old. In 1804,
Napoléon instituted a random draw to select the conscripts. Therefore, there is no selection
bias with these data as each young men had the same probability to serve23. On top of that, at
the end of the 19th century, the height of conscripts drew away from the normal distribution
only in a small number of departments24 [Bassino and Dormois, 2009]25.
Data on the height, collected at the level of districts for the 1818-1830 time period on 489 160
twenty years old conscripts (that is to say on men born between 1798 and 1810) is presented
and analysed in [Aron et al., 1972]. The average height was clearly mirroring the economic
development of France. This is in line with other studies exhibiting strong correlations between
height, living and health conditions, work at young ages, nutritional intake, ... during the 17th
and 18th centuries [Komlos et al., 2003], the 19th century [Villermé, 1829], at the end of this
former and during the following [Chamla, 1964], [Meerten, 1990], [Brinkman et al., 1988]26.
For the present study, I select the percentage of young men whose height was above 1.679 meters
and call this measure "the percentage of high heights among conscripts". The average height
22See Table A2 in the Appendix.
23There still existed some ways to avoid entering the army since wealthy enough people could pay a substitute
for their sons by means of a contract before notary. Moreover, some conscripts were still volunteers. However,
as this represented only a small part of the total conscripts, it should not lead to a bias in the quality of average
height as a proxy for economic resources.
24None of these departments are part of the ones for which data on education has been collected at the
primary school and municipal levels.
25What could be important is also to control for the fact that some conscripts may have enrolled in districts
different from the ones where they were born in. However, migrations at the beginning of the nineteenth century
were on average 35 kilometres long [Heffernan, 1989], mostly concentrated below 55 kilometres even at the end
of the century [Rosental et al., 2000], [Rosental, 2004]. Therefore, it is very unlikely that a sufficient number of
young men would have migrated to a department differing greatly in terms of economic resources to bias the
measure.
26See [Steckel, 1995] for a review of the literature on this point.
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was around 1.65 meters for the whole sample. However, since this measure was reported by
intervals in the original data, I select as "tall" the conscripts present from the interval next to the
one where the average height lied27. Comparing data on conscripts to the economic indicators
available at the department level tends to confirm that the percentage of high heights can be
used as a fairly good proxy for economic resources. There was indeed a positive correlation
between this measure and life expectancy, the production of cereals per hectare and the amount
of taxes on doors and windows per capita at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Height
was on the contrary negatively correlated with mortality rate between 0-5 years old and the
price of wheat per hectolitre28.
Descriptively, the percentage of high heights among military conscripts correlates positively
with the aggregated data on education at the district level29.
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Figure 2: High heights among conscripts and primary schooling
Source: Guizot Survey and military data on conscripts from [Aron et al., 1972].
27Height intervals, the histogram of the percentage of high heights and the geographical repartition of high
conscripts are reported in Figure B2 in the Appendix. The percentage of high heights varied between 13%
ad 56% with a mean of 32%. There was a quite strong symmetry between the map of high heights and the
distribution of marriage signatures and municipalities with schools [Aron et al., 1972], [Ladurie et al., 1976],
[Ladurie and Demonet, 1980].
28This price is taken as measure of food cost. See Figure B4 in the Appendix.
29The geographical patterns of high heights and municipal investment in primary schooling indicators are
displayed in Figure B3 in the Appendix. They illustrate the correspondence at the department level between
these two phenomena.
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Figure 2 plots the relationship between this percentage and the ratio of municipalities with
primary schools, the number of public schools per 100 municipalities, the number of teachers
benefiting from an accommodation or accommodation allowance from municipalities and the
number of children attending schools per 100 children and single people. The correlations are
all positive and significant30. Therefore, districts in which the standards of living were higher
were also characterised by high enrolment rates and a strong concentration of primary schools
and municipal grants.
In order to evaluate this relation, I use the following simple OLS framework :
Schoolingarr,d = αarr + β1Heightarr,d + β2Indarr,d + β3Demoarr,d + β4Ecod + εarr,d (1)
where Schooling stands for primary schooling variables at the level of the district arr and
department d. Height represents the percentage of high heights among military conscripts, Ind
stands for industrial controls, Demo for demographical and geographical controls and Eco for
economic controls at the department level31. Standard errors indexed by d are clustered at the
department level. This is done in order to account for spatial correlation within them. Indeed,
as some control variables are defined at a more aggregated level than districts, not doing so could
cause standard errors to be seriously downward-biased and lead to spurious findings. This may
happen for example if the micro units (the districts) share some unobservable characteristics
in a given group (departments) [Moulton, 1986], [Moulton, 1990]. For example, the long-term
effect of Protestant settlement and the use of a patois were identified in the literature as having
influenced schooling spread32.
For what regards demographic and geographic variables, I control by the average altitude of
municipalities within each district, their surface area, their total population in 1831 and by
the share of their population that is considered to have been scattered. This last measure is
coming from the postal survey and based on a simple contiguity criterion. It is expected to have
influenced negatively primary schooling by increasing the distance from habitations to schools
and therefore decreasing the number of pupils. Mountainous land is expected to have had the
same effect. Population should, on the contrary, have increased the potential number of pupils
and the resources municipalities could dedicate to education. I also add the number of single
people and children in 1831 in each department as a control. Surface area’s effect is a priori
less clear since it could have at the same increase distances from school and the amount of
agricultural resources available. Finally, I also control by the fact that the prefecture is located
30Their magnitudes are respectively of 0.64, 0.69, 0.56 and 0.62, all significant at a one-percent level.
31See the description of data in the Appendix to have a full list of the controls used in the estimations.
32Indeed the effects of the Reform and Counter-Reform were found to have had a positive effect on schools. See
for example [Laget, 1971] in the case of Bas-Languedoc. Moreover, at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the strong presence of a patois was identified by social observers as a barrier to the spread of instruction.
Evidence seems to comfort this point of view as, for example, in the case of Morbihan, the fact of speaking
Breton compared to French was correlated with a lower literacy rate, for any kinds of profession [Furet and
Ozouf, 1977b].
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in the district at stake.
Economic controls at the district level are: the ratio of municipalities with industrial activities,
the number of workers and engines in industry along with the value of industrial production.
The amount of agricultural land is also controlled for. Finally, at the level of departments, I
also control by the length of roads and water communications, the price of wheat in 1799, the
amount of taxes on doors and windows per capita in 1836, the production of cereals per hectare
in 1815 and life expectancy at birth in 1806-1810. These economic controls are complemented
by the number of presbyteries used as a proxy for religious influence.
Results are displayed in Table 2. The presence of primary schools as well as the public invest-
ment in instruction were negatively influenced by population dispersion and positively by the
presence of industrial factories which can be taken as a sign of economic dynamism. Popula-
tion dispersion is the only demographic or geographic variable remaining significant across the
specifications. This is in line with the importance attributed to the effect of this variable on
education in historical case studies [Furet and Ozouf, 1977b]. All the coefficients associated to
the percentage of high heights among conscripts are positive and significant. Given that this
percentage had a standard deviation of 9, one standard deviation increase implied a rise of
around 6.7 in the percentage of municipalities with schools within the districts. The effect was
of the same magnitude for the number of public school per 100 municipalities. When decom-
posing this latter, it appears that the magnitude was slightly higher for what regards providing
teachers with an accommodation or an allowance than for paying them on a regular annual
basis. This was certainly due to the fact that municipalities could more easily find an empty
house for their teachers than the funds necessary to pay them during a whole year. Therefore,
economic resources tended to be to associated with a higher total number of schools, a higher
percentage of municipalities with schools and municipal investment in education.
The same was true for enrolment rates33. Since there is no data on the number of children per
district before the mid-nineteenth century, I take the number of children and single people as
the denominator in the enrolment rate measure. This assumes the repartition between children
and single people to have been equivalent between districts, which seems to be a fairly reason-
able assumption. One standard deviation increase in the heights of conscripts was associated
to a 3.3 increase in the number of pupils schooled.
33Pupils attending schools in winter are taken into account in this enrolment measure. This is done in order to
avoid letting aside all children performing agricultural tasks in summertime. Taking winter numbers therefore
prevents from downplaying the importance of primary schooling in agricultural districts.
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Table 2: Heights of conscripts and primary schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentage of Primary schools Public schools Accommodation Paid teachers Enrolment
municipalities with per 100 municipalities per 100 municipalities or allowance per per 100 schools
primary schools 100 schools
High heights among 0.682*** 0.874** 0.759*** 0.523* 0.499* 0.366***
conscripts (3.292) (2.174) (2.922) (1.724) (1.979) (3.101)
Population dispersion -0.388*** -0.527*** -0.655*** -0.338*** -0.511*** -0.126***
(-5.658) (-4.890) (-6.356) (-3.935) (-6.372) (-2.782)
Factories’ presence 0.288*** 0.467*** 0.565*** 0.221 0.154 -0.046
(2.813) (2.770) (4.028) (1.632) (0.988) (-0.780)
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department clusters 81 80 81 81 81 81
Observations 268 264 270 268 264 267
R2 0.563 0.505 0.701 0.592 0.596 0.689
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: High heights among conscripts refers to the percentage of conscripts in each district taller than national mean. Population dispersion is the
percentage of population which was reported scattered in the Postal Survey, based on a contiguity criterion [Roncayolo, 1987]. Factories’ presence is the
percentage of municipalities in which at least one factory more than ten workers was located. The enrolment rate is defined as the number of children
attending schools in winter per 100 children and single people.
Taking another measure of height as a robustness check, the number of young men that were
examined but deemed too small (below 1.57 meters) for the conscription doesn’t change the
results34. Thanks to the Guizot survey, I can also take as a dependent variable the public
investment at the level of municipalities and not districts. Descriptively, the proportion of
municipalities with at least one primary school was higher in districts where the proportion
of high heights was high too. This was also the case with any type of municipal investment
and the wages provided to teachers35. The relation is confirmed by the use of OLS estima-
tions, displayed in Table A4 in the Appendix. Whether using department wealth controls or
department fixed effects, the results remain positive and significant. This is true for any type
of investment: paying teachers a fixed salary (and its amount), providing them with an accom-
modation, a classroom, another municipal occupation (and its salary amount).
Public investment was also higher in wealthier districts when focusing on schoolhouses. Esti-
mations outcomes in Table A5 in the Appendix indicate that the percentage of municipalities
with a sufficient number of schoolhouses was higher in districts well-endowed in economic re-
sources, and where population dispersion was lower. They also indicate that the total number
of schoolhouses was higher in such districts, along with the number of schoolhouses owned by
34See Table A3 in the Appendix. The results are all negative and significant with respect to the same
dependent variables that were under scrutiny in the previous table, except when public schools are decomposed
between teachers with a salary and teachers with an accommodation This is certainly due to the fact that I
don’t have the percentage of teachers paid or provided with an accommodation at the level of districts. Since
more primary schools existed in the areas where public investment was high, this entails that decomposing
this investment between its different components may reduce the number of observations too much to induce a
significant difference with districts where public investment was low.
35See Figure B5 in the Appendix.
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municipalities. The effect on the number rented was positive but not significant. Erecting a
building only dedicated to primary instruction demonstrated a great involvement of municipal-
ities. Indeed, in half of the districts, less than one-third of all municipalities were deemed as
endowed with a sufficient number of schoolhouses in the survey.
This section was not intended to prove the causal impact of economic resources on primary
schools. However, it did demonstrate that, after the Revolution, the districts well-endowed in
economic resources were also characterised by a high concentration of schools, a higher pro-
portion of public schools and greater enrolment rates. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, the
geographical pattern of education remained quite stable from the Revolution to the Guizot
law. Therefore, municipalities with a longer educational tradition took over the control of pri-
mary instruction and substituted their own resources to the religious taxes that were previously
financing the schools. They were able to do so since these municipalities were also endowed with
higher economic resources after the Revolution. In districts and municipalities where resources
were scarcer and education previously less developed, primary schools remained generally pri-
vate, financed only by fees, and were characterised by low enrolment rates. Municipalities in
richer areas could also have left education to be financed this way, as families had a higher
purchasing power there and could more easily pay the schooling fees. However, they did not so,
and this is an important point. Indeed, they didn’t only substitute a public supply of schools
to the previous religious one. Municipalities also acted vigorously to increase enrolment rates
and improve teaching conditions and the accumulation of human capital.
5 Lower Schooling Fees Level and Higher Enrolment
Rates in Public Primary Schools
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Over the 22 departments in the database, only 2.8% of the schools were totally free for families.
Paying schooling fees was therefore part and parcel of primary instruction, even when the
school was provided with municipal investment. These fees were paid monthly to teachers.
Their level depended on the number of subjects learned and, therefore, often on the age of
the pupil. Indeed, education was thought in a more linear way than nowadays. Children were
first learning how to read, then how to write, then the basics of numeracy and so on [Mayeur,
2004]36. If the teacher was depending only on schooling fees to make a living, then he could fix
their level as he intended to. However, when he was provided with municipal grants, this level
was subject to a negotiation between the teacher and local authorities.
These fees could constitute a high cost for families who wanted their children to attend primary
schools. The minimum level to learn only how to read was often set between 50 and 75 cents of
36Part of the fees could be paid in kind, which is hard to take into account and is a limit to the reliability
of the data used. Loafs of bread, for example, could serve as a complement to payments in money [Furet and
Ozouf, 1977b].
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francs. Learning the arithmetic costed typically between 1.5 and 1.75 francs. Pupils learning
history, geography, linear drawing, land surveying or music had to pay more37. On average,
paying the schooling fees for one child amounted to spend between 1 and 1.2 francs per month38.
This was equivalent to the daily wage of an industrial female worker, between 50% and 71% of an
industrial male daily wage. The agricultural survey of 1852 indicates the annual spendings and
savings of a day-worker family with three children39. Assuming that one of them was working
and, depending on the hypotheses made on the attendance of the two children left (both 12
months, one 12 and the other 6 or both 6 months) schooling fees represented respectively 16,
21 or 26% of total savings. The fees were therefore a strong economic barrier to the schooling
of children coming from destitute backgrounds.
Then, one could expect schooling fees to have been higher in richer areas, where families had
a greater purchasing power and where children were learning more. However, in Figure 3,
the geographical distribution of fees appears to have been the opposite to the one of primary
schools and enrolment rates. Indeed, fees were higher south of the Saint-Malo/Geneva line,
especially in the Gironde region and in the Mediterranean area. Their level correlated therefore
negatively with the percentage of high height among conscripts within districts. Areas more
endowed in schools and economic resources were also those where the fees were the lowest.
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Figure 3: Distribution of schooling fees
Source: Statistique générale de la France, Guizot survey, military data on conscripts from [Aron et al., 1972].
Note: Departments in blue are the ones for which education data are available at the level of municipalities.
This was also true at the level of primary schools themselves. Since the number of children at the
municipal level is not available for the time period under scrutiny, I report here as an enrolment
rate the number of pupils per 100 inhabitants. I divide municipalities into quarters depending
on their population in order to have similar towns in terms of population age structure. As
37These were the subjects which could be taught in primary schools along with literacy, numeracy and religious
instruction. Only a few children were actually studying them.
38See Table A6 in the Appendix.
39Those were clearly the poorest among agricultural workers since, for example, food represented between 57
and 79% of their annual spendings, with a mean of 66%.
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displayed in Figure 4, the higher the fees were in a school, the lower the enrolment rate. This
was especially true for the first three population quarters. Therefore, there seems to have been
a link between economic resources, municipal investment in schools, lower schooling fees and
higher enrolment rates.
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Figure 4: Average schooling fees (cents of franc) and enrolment. Primary school level
Source: Guizot survey.
5.2 A Municipal Will to Lower Schooling Fees
This relation is verified by OLS estimations, both at the level of districts and of primary schools.
When more public schools were present in a district, fees were on average lower. The effect was
especially strong when the municipal investment consisted in paying teachers40. The advantage
of using data at the level of primary schools is to have a direct measure of municipal investment
and schooling fees. Also, I can control by several other variables only reported at this level
which could have influenced the fees. This gives more reliability to the estimations. Therefore,
I add to the controls used so far41 the number of subjects taught, the fact of welcoming girls, if
40See Table A7 in the Appendix.
41Demographic, geographic and industrial variables are available at the level of municipalities. Only agri-
cultural area is still included at the level of districts. Literacy rates of men and women in 1686-1690 are also
taken into account in order to control for any effect of the long term educational tradition on schooling fees and
enrolment rates in 1833.
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the school was a boarding one, the average admission age and length of schooling, the fact of
having books in sufficient number, the number of persons at charge for the teacher and his level
of certification. Indeed, the fees could have been higher if many pupils were learning several
subjects and therefore staying at school for a longer period of time. By the same token, parents
had to pay more if children were boarders or if schools were well-endowed in teaching materials.
At last, if the teacher was more qualified or if more persons were at his charge, he was more
likely to ask for higher fees.
In Table 3, I regress the level of schooling fees on a set of binary variables indicating if the
teacher was provided with municipal grants in the primary school at stake. Therefore, each
coefficient corresponds to the estimation outcome of a regression. The difference between the
second and the third column is that I only take the average fees reported in the data in the
third one. In the second one, I add to them an average value of fees computed as the mean
between the maximum and the minimum values paid by parents when they were specified in
the data but that the average value was not. This is due to the fact that inspectors reported in
many cases only the minimum level of fees, that is to say the one paid by pupils only learning
religious instruction and how to read, and the maximum level paid by those learning several
subjects. They didn’t make an estimation of the average level of fees at the level of the school42.
I complement the data in order to have more observations at the primary school level. This
issue also exemplifies the importance of controlling by the average number of schooling years
and by the number of subjects taught. Indeed, if more pupils were learning several subjects,
the level of fees might have been high because of this composition effect but not because of
an active will of teachers or municipal authorities to set a high price for schooling. Therefore,
estimations at the primary schools level are much more reliable than between districts as they
control for this composition effect affecting the level of fees.
The impact of municipal investment is always negative, contributing to a reduction in the fees
paid. The magnitude of the effect is between 12 and 13 cents of francs, while the average
value of fees was around 1 franc per month. Therefore, on average, the mean level of fees
in a school publicly subsidised was around 10% lower than in its private counterparts. When
decomposing between the different types of subsidies, I find that providing teachers with a salary
or a classroom had a higher effect that providing them with an accommodation. Since being
paid annually was synonymous with financial ease, this doesn’t come as a surprise. Teachers
were certainly more willing to decrease fees when they were ensured with being paid on a
regular basis. A standard deviation in the salary paid by municipalities was implying a 7 cents
decrease of the level of fees. The higher magnitude of the effect without decomposing municipal
investment trough its different types is due to the fact that, in around 50% of the cases when a
school was subsidised, at least two types of grants were provided to teachers, the three of them
in 44.5% of the public schools. Municipalities investing in education often did so intensively,
42Doing this computation, I have to assume that the mean value between the minimum and maximum values
of fees is representative of the average level of fees paid by families. I also tried to take the computed average
value as the addition to the minimum one of the average spread between the minimum and the maximum values
when reported. This didn’t change the results, which are available upon request.
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using different types of financial support.
The negative effect on the maximum and minimum levels of fees are also interesting. The latter
level was the schooling cost of education parents had to pay so that their children could enter
the school43. Therefore, in schools with municipal investment, the cost of education for most
of the families was actually reduced by around 13%. The negative impact on the maximum
level, mostly associated to the provision of a fixed salary and its amount, also indicates that
the education cost was reduced even for pupils learning the highest number of subjects within
the school. The lowering of fees within public primary schools was therefore generalised for
all pupils. A direct consequence is that children were more likely to learn more within these
schools than within their private counterparts since the cost of learning several subjects (and
not only that of entering the school) was reduced. This point is studied in Section 6.
All these estimations show an association between municipal investment and low schooling fees.
As said before, there was a negotiation on their amount if municipalities were financing primary
schools [Furet and Ozouf, 1977b]. When they did so, teachers were less dependent on fees to
make a living since part of their expenses or salary was provided by the economic resources of
the municipality. This higher financial ease and stability explains why they accepted to lower
the level of fees.
Table 3: Schooling subsidies and average schooling fees - Primary school level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minimum Computed average Average Maximum Minimum Computed average Average Maximum
schooling fees schooling fees schooling fees schooling fees schooling fees schooling fees schooling fees schooling fees
Fixed salary -9.485*** -7.330** -5.448* -11.213*** -9.102*** -6.146** -4.079 -16.821***
(-3.699) (-2.258) (-1.717) (-2.676) (-4.156) (-2.023) (-1.267) (-2.598)
Observations 1703 1460 976 1619 2018 1468 964 1647
R2 0.517 0.636 0.665 0.554 0.573 0.658 0.686 0.587
Fixed salary amount -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.032** -0.051*** -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.028** -0.052***
(-3.588) (-2.819) (-2.487) (-3.009) (-2.860) (-3.039) (-2.162) (-3.227)
Observations 1690 1452 971 1610 1978 1459 959 1637
R2 0.516 0.639 0.669 0.557 0.565 0.661 0.690 0.588
Accommodation -5.277* -5.110 -7.543** -1.935 -6.694*** -6.551** -7.978** -6.098
(-1.968) (-1.569) (-2.187) (-0.409) (-2.812) (-2.163) (-2.236) (-1.451)
Observations 1409 1183 799 1316 1718 1190 786 1342
R2 0.495 0.627 0.667 0.538 0.564 0.650 0.689 0.569
Classroom -7.217** -7.814** -9.832** -4.328 -8.124*** -7.237** -9.892 ** -6.808
(-2.641) (-2.248) (-2.398) (-0.840) (-3.242) (-2.149) (-2.330) (-1.370)
Observations 1409 1183 799 1316 1718 1190 786 1342
R2 0.497 0.629 0.669 0.539 0.565 0.650 0.690 0.569
Subsidised school -12.127*** -12.268** -13.920** -14.161** -12.281*** -9.412* -14.292** -11.582*
(-2.770) (-2.413) (-2.311) (-2.129) (-2.785) (-1.830) (-2.372) (-1.780)
Observations 1674 1433 963 1582 1992 1443 952 1611
R2 0.516 0.635 0.669 0.554 0.573 0.658 0.692 0.585
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Department fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 61 57 44 59 69 65 47 67
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
43It is not possible to know exactly the proportion of pupils paying only this minimum level. However, the
proximity between this latter, 90 cents of francs, and the average level of fees, 96 cents, indicate clearly that
many of the children actually learnt only religious principles and how to read and write at school.
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In columns(5) to (8), I run the same estimations including department fixed effects so that
the effect of public subsidies is measured using within-departments variation only. As the level
of public investment was highly varying between them, this enables to control by economic
or social factors specific to a department which might have influenced public investment, the
presence of schools and schooling fees. The significance of the outcomes is only slightly modified
by this adjustment. Therefore, either in department well-endowed in primary schools or where
education achievement was low, public subsidies were associated with a fall in the cost of
education parents had to bear.
5.3 Lower Fees, Higher Enrolment
The lower level of fees in public primary schools was associated with higher enrolment rates.
Municipalities didn’t invest in schools only to ensure the stability of teachers’ presence, but also
to increase enrolment. Indeed, a response to the investment of municipalities was that teachers
had to welcome freely indigent children chosen by local authorities. They were arbitrarily listed
by municipalities and teachers had no means to refuse these pupils44. On average, in 1833, 21%
of the pupils were welcomed freely. This percentage amounted to 23.6% in public schools and
to 10.7% in their private counterparts. Therefore, in exchange for a higher stability in their
occupation, teachers were accepting to lower the level of fees and to welcome more pupils, who
were either paying less or were attending primary schools freely.
At the level of districts, and therefore for the entire country, an increase in the average fees paid
was clearly associated with a fall in enrolment, as displayed in Table 4. In all these estimations,
I control by the number of pupils freely attending schools so that the effect on enrolment
rates is coming from families paying fees. I also control by the total number of schools within
districts and by the percentage of municipalities with schools since they were associated to a
higher enrolment without any link with the average level of fees. In columns (2) and (4), I also
control by the ratio of public schools within districts. In districts where municipal investment
in education was high, schooling fees were lower, which contributed to widen the number of
pupils attending schools. A standard deviation increase of 50 cents of francs in the average
level of fees was entailing a reduction in enrolment between 2.2 and 4.3 pupils per 100 children
and single people. Given that the average enrolment rate was of 19, this implied a reduction
between 11% and 22% of the enrolment rate for one standard deviation in the average schooling
fees45.
44These lists were sometimes contested since some families were putting pressure on local authorities so that
their children would be counted as indigents and could attend schools freely. Indeed, as there were often, for
example in small and poor municipalities, more indigent children that one teacher could deal with, most of
them were actually not provided with free education. The criteria according to which children were listed or not
remain obscure and there was no clearly-defined process to select between them those who would be educated
freely.
45In order to investigate the robustness of these estimations, I made use of the 1851 Census which reports
the number of children by age in each department. Thanks to it, I can have an approximation of the number
of children in each district and I don’t have to rely on the number of children and single people to measure
enrolment rates. The results were not affected by this modification. The effect of the average level of fees on
enrolment remained negative and significant, with a slightly higher order of magnitude. See Table A8 in the
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Table 4: Schooling fees and enrolment rates - District level
Pupils per 100 children and single people
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average schooling fees -7.564*** -5.519*** -4.339*** -3.958***
(-6.170) (-3.948) (-3.208) (-2.674)
Total number of schools 0.086*** 0.096*** 0.067*** 0.070***
(3.125) (3.551) (2.908) (3.065)
Percentage of municipalities with schools 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.144*** 0.141***
(4.109) (4.025) (4.253) (4.119)
Free pupils -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(-0.928) (-1.272) (1.444) (1.347)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ratio of public schools No Yes No Yes
Department wealth controls No No Yes Yes
Department clusters 81 81 74 74
Observations 265 265 244 244
R2 0.788 0.793 0.864 0.864
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Average schooling fees are defined in francs. Free pupils correspond to the total number of pupils freely welcomed in
primary schools within each district.
As before, the use of more disaggregated data is useful in specifying this relation. In Table 5,
I study enrolment rates at the municipality level, controlling by the same factors as in Table 3
and adding the number of free pupils. The measure of fees used in the estimations is the
computed level of average fees. However, the issue remains that I don’t know the number
of children at the level of municipalities. To decrease the potential bias linked to different
age structure, I divide the estimations by population size. Indeed, municipalities with the
same number of inhabitants were more likely to have been close in the age structure of their
population. I run the regressions on municipalities less than 631 inhabitants, which was the
median population level, and on those above this threshold. I also do so on municipalities less
than 2 000 inhabitants, which amounts to excluding the top 10% in terms of population from
the analysis46. I also control by the total number of schools in the municipality.
The effect found is always negative and strongly significant. In municipalities less than 631
inhabitants, one standard deviation increase in the average level of fees between schools (of
around 48 cents of francs) was entailing a fall in enrolment between 0.8 and 1.6 pupils per 100
inhabitants, depending on the addition of department wealth controls. The average enrolment in
these municipalities was of 13.4 pupils per 100 inhabitants. Therefore, one standard deviation
increase in the average level of fees was associated with a fall between 6% and 12% of the
Appendix.
46See information on population deciles in Table A9 in the Appendix.
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enrolment rate. The effect of such a standard deviation on municipalities more than the median
population was a fall of the enrolment rate between 12.5% and 25%. On municipalities less
than 2 000 inhabitants, the effect was bounded between 5% and 16%.
Therefore, the impact was close in magnitude between small municipalities below the median
population and the bottom 90% of them in terms of population size. Many families in all these
municipalities were therefore quite dependent on the cost of education. A fall in the level of
fees was inducing a substantive rise in enrolment rates. The similarity of the effect between
them also indicates that the age structure of the population was certainly not differing much
between the two groups of villages47. The inclusion of department fixed effects doesn’t modify
the significance or the magnitude of the outcomes.
As a robustness check, I substituted the average level of fees by their minimum amount. I still
find a negative effect of fees on enrolment, valid for municipalities less than 2 000 inhabitants
and more then the median population level. The magnitude of the impact is decreased compared
to the previous estimations. This is due to the fact that a fall in the minimum level is only
prompting more pupils to enter the school, while a fall in the average level is also associated
with pupils staying at school for a longer period of time, which is contributing to increase even
more enrolment rates48.
The reverse causality issue remains weak in these estimations. Indeed, the level of fees was
first set by the teacher after a potential negotiation with municipal authorities. Then, families
decided whether or not sending their children to school. Moreover, even if many pupils were
subsequently schooled for a given level of fees, there was no strong incentive for teachers to lower
this level by themselves. The municipal investment was ensuring them with a financial stability
which made this lowering acceptable in the negotiation. However, when no such investment was
present, teachers had interest in maximising the income coming from fees, even when enrolment
rate was high. Indeed, they were, on average and compared to the other professions, not at ease
financially speaking [Lorain, 1837]. That is why this occupation was often seen and described as
unenviable in the nineteenth century, especially before the Guizot Law which for the first time
implemented a minimum annual salary for teachers [Prost, 1968]. This argument also applies
for these estimations in Table 3. Finding an altruistic and wealthy enough teacher, willing
to decrease schooling fees, and being rewarded for his involvement in education by municipal
authorities afterwards was extremely unlikely.
47The number of town for which average schooling fees are available is too low to run regressions only on
towns more than 2 000 inhabitants. The effect found is negative but the number of observations and of clusters
become too low to be reliable.
48See Table A10 in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Average schooling fees and enrolment. Municipality level
Dependent variable : Pupils per 100 inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Population Population Population Population Population Population Population Population Population
≤631 (Med) ≤631 ≤631 ≥631 ≥631 ≥631 ≤2 000 ≤2 000 ≤2 000
Average schooling fees -0.032*** -0.017*** -0.016** -0.020*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.028*** -0.009*** -0.007**
(-5.097) (-2.802) (-2.530) (-6.327) (-3.815) (-3.153) (-6.554) (-3.104) (-2.142)
Number of schools 5.955*** 5.966*** 5.975*** 1.255*** 1.533*** 1.474*** 3.138*** 3.667*** 3.626***
(7.687) (7.434) (7.393) (6.329) (8.799) (8.132) (6.369) (8.307) (8.303)
Number of free pupils 0.073*** 0.050** 0.054** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.016 0.014
(3.625) (2.374) (2.502) (4.921) (3.806) (3.672) (3.210) (1.494) (1.339)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Department fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
District clusters 46 39 46 67 59 67 66 57 66
Observations 965 953 965 859 812 859 1709 1658 1709
R2 0.505 0.530 0.534 0.723 0.735 0.759 0.609 0.634 0.652
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Average schooling fees is computed in cents of franc as the mean value of fees within each municipality. When only the minimum and maximum values were specified for a
given school, the average value in this school was taken as the mean between these two extreme levels.
It could be argued that lower fees within public schools were prompting their private coun-
terparts in the same municipality to also decrease the cost of education in order to attract
more pupils. In this case, the effect of fees on enrolment rates would also be due to spillover
effects on private schools. However, there were at least one public and one private school in
only 6.7% of the municipalities with schools. In only 38 municipalities were there strictly more
than one public and one private school. Therefore, it is unlikely that these spillover effects were
important in explaining the variations in enrolment rates.
Still, to give further reliability to the previous estimations and to avoid any potential interac-
tion between schools, I restrict the sample of municipalities to those in which only one primary
school was present. I do so in order to see if enrolment rates were higher in municipalities
with one public school compared to those with one private. Schooling fees were much lower
in municipalities with a public school, with an average level of 90 cents of francs against 1.34
in those with one private. Estimation outcomes are displayed in Table 6. To ensure an homo-
geneous age pattern, I restrict the sample to municipalities less than 4 000 inhabitants in the
third and fourth columns, which amounts to letting aside around 1% of the municipalities. I do
so on municipalities less than 1 000 inhabitants in columns five and six, which is equivalent to
keeping the 75% less populated. Selecting other bounds wouldn’t change the results which are
quite close for any population restriction. The presence of a subsidised school compared to a
private one was associated with a reduction of around 0.5 pupils per 100 inhabitants after the
introduction of department controls. This corresponded to a 4% increase in enrolment rates.
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Table 6: Public schooling and enrolment in municipalities with one school.
Dependent variable : Pupils per 100 inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All All All Population Population Population Population Population Population
sample sample sample ≤4 000 ≤4 000 ≤4 000 ≤1 000 ≤1 000 ≤1 000
Subsidised school 1.149*** 0.498*** 0.432** 1.114*** 0.481** 0.413** 1.064*** 0.480** 0.546**
(3.577) (2.666) (2.413) (3.468) (2.508) (2.256) (2.847) (2.074) (2.353)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Department fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
District clusters 71 62 71 71 62 71 64 55 64
Observations 2163 1888 2163 2156 1881 2156 1720 1521 1720
R2 0.582 0.621 0.653 0.585 0.625 0.657 0.536 0.598 0.610
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Only municipalities with one primary school are selected in these estimations. Municipalities with one public primary school are therefore compared to their
counterparts with only one private school.
6 Public Education, Teaching Efficiency and Intensive
Human Capital Accumulation
So far, I demonstrated that from the Revolution to the Guizot Law, a high concentration
of schools was closely associated to a high municipal investment, this latter implying lower
schooling fees and higher enrolment rates. In this section, I will show that municipal investment
was also linked to better teaching conditions and a higher intensive accumulation of human
capital. By intensive, I mean that not only enrolment rates were higher (which would be an
extensive accumulation of capital, the one exhibited in the previous section), but that pupils
were also learning more.
6.1 The Recruitment of More Qualified Teachers
The Guizot survey provides information on the certification level of teachers. After 1816,
in order to be able to practise, they had to obtain a certificate delivered after an examination
conducted by a civil servant belonging to the ministry of public instruction. Three degrees were
composing this school certificate, the third one being the lowest on the hierarchy since teachers
could obtain it thanks to a minimum mastering of numeracy and literacy. With additional
notions of spelling and calculus, they were likely to obtain the second degree. The first one was
only accessible for teachers mastering grammar, land surveying, geography and arithmetic.
In Table 7, I regress municipal investment in primary schools on these characteristics in order
to know if teachers with a higher certification were more or less likely to be recruited in public
schools. In order to analyse the certification’s effect, I introduce the three degrees in the
estimations to know their impact, compared to the situation in which the teacher had no
certificate, on the probability for a teacher to practise in a public school. I do so since 6%
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of the teachers still didn’t abide by the 1816 law and had no certificate in 1833. A positive
effect would therefore mean that municipalities tended to more often recruit teachers with a
certificate, a signal that the teacher made the efforts to acquire sufficient knowledge to pass the
examination. It is also possible that a teacher was already employed in a public school before
1816 and that he was prompted by municipal authorities to abide by the new law after this
date. In this case, there was no recruitment of better quality teachers but an in-service training
decided by the municipality. If the teacher was not able to do so, the municipality could have
very well recruited another one. Consequently, the coefficient associated to the certification
degree captures either the effect of the certificate on the probability to be recruited by a public
school, or its impact on the probability to be kept in a public school.
All certificate degrees were associated with a higher probability to teach in a public school49.
The magnitude of the effect was of respectively 10, 9 and 7.6 percentage points for the first,
second and third degree. More qualified teachers were therefore more likely to practise in public
schools and to be recruited by them. The effect was especially strong on the probability to be
paid annually by the municipality, respectively 18, 16.6 and 8.5 percentage points. Only the
second degree of certification had a positive effect on the salary’s amount and the provision of an
accommodation or a classroom. It also had a positive impact on the probability to be granted
with another municipal occupation, along with the third level. The absence of significant effect
for the first degree when decomposing public subsidies is due to the fact that a teacher with
this level of qualification was present in only 1.6% of the primary schools in the database.
Therefore, this amounts to restricting highly the number of teachers with this certificate level
and a given subsidy.
All in all, teachers who obtained the second degree certificate, 38% of them, were more likely
obtain any kind of subsidy and to be paid more. The 54% of teachers who obtained only the
third degree were also more likely to be subsidised by the municipalities, but mostly through
the provision of a fixed salary or another municipal occupation. Their salary was however on
average not significantly higher than the one of subsidised teachers without certificate. This
is in line with the fact that these teachers were more often employed in smaller municipalities
endowed with lower economic resources compared to the ones with a second-degree certificate.
Therefore, these municipalities were more often hiring a teacher and providing him another
occupation at the same time. They were also selecting teachers with a certificate and providing
them with a fixed salary more often, even if this salary remained low.
Logit estimations confirm these outcomes for the three certification degrees50. Teachers with a
third-degree certificate were around 1.7 times more likely to be provided with municipal grants,
1.6 times to be provided with a fixed salary or another municipal occupation. Teachers with
a second-degree certificate were more likely to be granted with any type of subsidy, with a
magnitude of around 2 times for the provision of a municipal grant generally speaking.
49Descriptively, there were 84% of the teachers with a first-degree certificate practising in public schools, 85%
of those with a second-degree and 78% of the teachers with a first-degree.
50See Table A11 in the Appendix.
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Table 7: Teaching certificates and public primary schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subsidised Fixed Salary Accommodation Classroom Other municipal
school salary amount occupation
First-degree certificate 0.100* 0.179*** 71.437 0.118* 0.073 0.104
(1.714) (2.675) (1.351) (1.716) (0.914) (1.444)
Second-degree certificate 0.090*** 0.166*** 28.973** 0.128*** 0.073** 0.101***
(2.878) (5.408) (2.120) (3.561) (2.166) (3.181)
Third-degree certificate 0.076** 0.085*** -19.926 0.028 0.030 0.092***
(2.630) (3.382) (-1.547) (0.923) (1.014) (3.241)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 74 74 68 73 73 74
Observations 4052 4098 2640 3604 3604 4076
R2 0.299 0.296 0.320 0.327 0.346 0.344
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Certification degrees’ impact is evaluated compared to the situation in which the teacher had no certificate. The salary
amount is in francs per year.
6.2 Teaching Characteristics and Progress of Pupils
More qualified teachers were more concentrated in public schools. However, was this higher
concentration leading to a greater accumulation of human capital ? To answer this question, I
selected two sets of variables in the Guizot survey that can be taken as indicators of teaching
quality and of the volume of knowledge learnt by pupils. The first set corresponds to qualitative
variables and the second one to quantitative measures related to the number of subjects learnt
and to the average number of years spent at school. The qualitative indicators are all binary
variables taking the value one if the school was controlled by the teacher in terms of order,
discipline and work. Another indicator is the fact that pupils were making progress and an
evaluation of teaching quality, deemed satisfactory or not by the inspector51.
In the data, the variables on teaching conditions and quality were coded with four to six items,
typically from "very good" to "very bad". I collapsed them into binary variables in order to
decrease any inspector-specific effect in the evaluation of teaching quality. If inspectors were not
likely to make exactly the same observation about a teacher, there is a fairly good probability
that a teacher deemed as bad by a given inspector wouldn’t have been reported as good by
another one. The recoding used should therefore decrease the likelihood of any bias associated
to the individual evaluation of teaching quality.
In Table 8, I regress these indicators on public investment. All coefficients are positive and
strongly significant52. This investment was increasing by around 6 and 7 percentage points the
51The questions asked in the survey were: "How is the school controlled for what regards order, discipline
and work ?", "What is the state of teaching ?", "Are pupils making progress ?".
52Logit estimations lead to similar outcomes. See Table A12 in the Appendix. There could be a reverse
causality issue here since municipalities may have decided to subsidise a teacher because he was efficient.
However it is hard to see why, with a limited amount of resources, local authorities would be prompted to do
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probability of having order and discipline in the classroom, by 10 the probability that pupils
worked correctly. The effect on teaching quality had around the same magnitude and the
impact on pupils’ progress was of 7 percentage points. Teaching quality was therefore higher
in public schools as pupils were more often making progress, within classrooms where teachers
were more efficient and the environment more suitable to work.
Decomposing public investment between its different subsidies doesn’t modify the results. All
grants, except the provision of another municipal occupation which characterised smaller and
poorer municipalities, was significantly associated with better teaching conditions and more
progress made by pupils53.
Table 8: Public primary schooling and teaching characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order Discipline Work Teaching Progress
Subsidised school 0.064** 0.068** 0.102*** 0.094*** 0.068***
(2.085) (2.322) (3.297) (3.122) (2.773)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 73 71 73 74 74
Observations 3708 3381 3376 3570 3544
R2 0.041 0.044 0.058 0.069 0.055
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Subsidised school is a binary variables which is equal to one if the municipality was investing in the school at stake. Order,
Discipline, Work, Teaching and Progress are all binary variables taking the value to one when the school was controlled by the teacher for
what regards order, discipline and work, when his teaching was deemed satisfactory and when pupils were making progress.
The association between public schooling and teaching efficiency was greatly due to the fact that
more qualified teachers were also more efficient. In Table 9, I regress teaching characteristics
and the progress made by pupils on the certificate degrees. All three of them are linked with a
higher teaching quality. The second degree is the most strongly and significantly associated with
this quality and with the progress of pupils54. This certificate was the most robustly influencing
the probability to be subsidised. Municipalities investing in education were therefore recruiting
these teachers to ensure a higher teaching efficiency. All these elements indicate that the
accumulation of human capital should have been higher within public primary schools.
so if the schools was already functioning well. It is more likely that, by recruiting better teachers and providing
them with grants, municipalities were actually voluntarily trying to increase teaching efficiency.
53See Table A13 and Table A14 in the Appendix.
54Using a logit estimation technique leads to the same outcomes. See Table A15 in the Appendix.
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Table 9: Teaching certificates and teaching characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order Discipline Work Teaching Progress
First-degree certificate 0.078 0.041 0.089 0.379*** 0.312***
(0.838) (0.447) (1.030) (3.995) (2.914)
Second-degree certificate 0.154*** 0.135*** 0.220*** 0.358*** 0.297***
(4.171) (3.577) (5.706) (9.706) (7.572)
Third-degree certificate -0.026 -0.036 0.037 0.122*** 0.051
(-0.815) (-1.022) (1.051) (3.809) (1.464)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 73 71 73 74 74
Observations 3792 3471 3335 3652 3621
R2 0.074 0.073 0.098 0.115 0.102
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Order, Discipline, Work, Teaching and Progress are all binary variables taking the value to one when the school was controlled by
the teacher for what regards order, discipline and work, when his teaching was deemed satisfactory and when pupils were making progress.
All independent variables are binary, taking the value one if the teacher had a certificate.
6.3 Number of Subjects and Schooling Years
In public schools, teaching characteristics were better and pupils were deemed to make more
progress. However, this is only a qualitative indication that they were learning more there than
in their private counterparts. The number of subjects taught within classrooms and the average
number of years spent at school reported in the Guizot survey are helpful to evaluate if human
capital accumulation was higher in these schools. If pupils were indeed learning more, the
average number of schooling years should have been higher in the primary school at stake, as
well as the number of subjects taught. This last measure was varying between one and eleven
subjects which were: religious instruction, reading, writing, spelling, grammar, arithmetic,
land surveying, linear drawing, geography, history and music. The most common subjects were
religious instruction, reading and writing. The average schooling years were reported between
one and nine. The education of pupils was typically beginning at five years old and was rarely
extended over fifteen years old in the primary institution, with an average schooling length of
five years.
The two measures are complementary. If more subjects were taught in a school, the average
schooling years should have been higher too. Indeed, pupils needed to study for a longer period
of time in order to master these subjects. It is however not possible with the data to know the
proportion of pupils that were learning all the subjects taught. As a consequence, it is hard to
say that a higher number of subjects was associated to a greater human capital accumulation
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for all pupils. It was at least the case for some of them. The number of schooling years is
helpful in specifying this point. Indeed, if the majority of pupils was learning all the subjects,
the average schooling years should have been high. If, on the contrary, it was the case for only
a minority of them, then this number of years shouldn’t have been greatly affected by the fact
that some pupils were learning more subjects.
Figure 5 displays the histogram of schooling years. The schools are divided in this graph
between the ones granted with a given subsidy and the private. Public schools were clearly
characterised by a higher number of schooling years. For any type of subsidy, there were around
20% of the schools in which pupils stayed six or seven years, 15% in which they stayed eight
or five years. It was on the contrary more common to remain less than six years in the private
schools. Indeed, in around 20% of them, pupils studied on average two or four years. In 30%,
they studied three years, in 15% five years. The accumulation of human capital was therefore
likely to be higher in primary schools since they were characterised by a higher schooling length.
The same was true for the number of subjects. Six, seven or eight subjects were more often
taught in public primary schools, two, three of four less often than in the private ones55.
T-tests confirm this association between public investment and a higher accumulation of human
capital. Indeed, around 4.8 subjects were taught in public schools against 4.6 in the private.
Pupils were on average spending 5.3 years in subsidised schools and around 4 in their private
counterparts. These mean values are all statistically different at a one-percent level. Each type
of subsidy (a fixed salary, an accommodation, a classroom and another municipal occupation)
was associated both to a significantly higher number of subjects taught and of schooling years56.
This is a strong indication that teachers wanted to keep children longer in the public schools
and making them learn more. Indeed, they could have tried to keep them a minimum amount
of years, once they benefited from public grants, since they were less dependent on fees and
were provided with a higher financial stability. In this case, they would have been paid or
accommodated with only a small number of pupils to teach. Being granted with municipal
subsidies was also likely to be a strong incentive to be involved in the education of children.
Indeed, apart from the fixed salary which was annually provided, municipalities could get rid
of the teacher pretty easily if he wasn’t deemed good enough by parents or the local authorities
themselves.
55See Figure B6 in the Appendix.
56See Table A16 and Table A17 in the Appendix. The number of subjects didn’t differ significantly between
schools where the teacher was provided with another municipal occupation and the others.
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Figure 5: Public schooling and schooling years - Histograms
Source: Guizot survey
Notes: Each bar in the histograms represents the percentage of observations corresponding to a given number of schooling years.
Therefore, it represents the percentage of primary schools for each number of years. The schools are divided between those which were
granted with public subsidises and the private ones. Each subsidy is therefore compared to the same histogram of schooling years drawn
only for private schools.
Estimation outcomes in Table 10 indicate that public investment was increasing the number
of subjects by 0.34 on average, and the number of schooling years by 0.29. Both effects are
significant at a one-percent level. In this table, I also add estimations on the probability that
a given subject was taught in the primary school. I exclude religion, reading and writing since
they were taught in nearly all schools57. Arithmetic was taught in 62% of the schools for which
this specification is available, grammar in 44%, spelling in 49%, geography and linear drawing
in 7%, land surveying in 10%, history and music in around 3%. All the percentages were
significantly higher in public schools, except for arithmetic, geography and history. Grammar
and spelling were for example taught in respectively 46 and 53% of the primary schools, against
38 and 35% of the private ones58.
The outcomes demonstrate that pupils were more likely to learn arithmetic, grammar, spelling
and linear drawing in a public school. The increase in the associated probability that these
subjects were taught is respectively of 8.2, 8.6, 8.3 and 2.8 percentage points. The effect
is particularly strong for arithmetic, grammar and spelling. Therefore, the accumulation of
human capital was higher in public schools thanks to a higher probability to learn arithmetic,
grammar, spelling and, for a much lower number of pupils, linear drawing59. Teaching in these
schools was not limited to the basics of literacy and to religious instruction. By recruiting better
57They were so in respectively 99.4, 98.4 and 92.1% of the primary schools for which this information is
available.
58See Table A18 in the Appendix.
59Logit estimations indicate that arithmetic was 1.6 times more likely to be taught in a public school, along
with grammar and spelling. Linear drawing was 2.7 times more likely to be so. See Table A19 in the Appendix.
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teachers more likely to be able to teach several subjects, and by lowering the cost of education,
municipalities increased the probability for pupils to learn more and in better conditions.
Table 10: Public schooling and human capital accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number Schooling Arithmetic Grammar Spelling Geography Land Linear History Music
of subjects duration surveying drawing
Subsidised school 0.344*** 0.289*** 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.017 0.006 0.028** 0.011 -0.004
(4.373) (2.976) (2.973) (3.564) (3.617) (1.094) (0.534) (2.449) (1.539) (-0.439)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Observations 3732 3628 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 3732
R2 0.134 0.506 0.187 0.153 0.270 0.069 0.082 0.045 0.047 0.094
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Note: All subject names correspond to binary variables taking value one if the subject was taught in the primary school.
7 Conclusion
After the shock of the Revolution, primary schooling reorganised around municipal investment.
In areas previously well-endowed in primary schools and where economic resources were higher,
municipalities took over the control of education. They contributed to a higher financial stabil-
ity of teachers and reinforced their presence by providing them with a fixed salary, a classroom,
an accommodation or an additional municipal employment. In poorer areas, on the contrary,
schools remained more scarce and more often private, only financed through fees. But munici-
palities went beyond the mere financing of schools and acted vigorously to decrease the cost of
education by lowering the level of schooling fees. Teachers accepted this decrease in exchange
for a higher financial ease. This led to an increase in enrolment rates within public schools
compared to their private counterparts, as primary education came at a lower cost for families.
Teachers recruited in schools provided with municipal grants had on average a higher level of
certification. Teaching conditions and progress made by the pupils were more often deemed
as satisfactory within these schools. The number of subjects taught, as well as the average
schooling years, were also higher in public schools. By lowering the fees and recruiting more
qualified teachers, municipalities prompted more children to attend schools and to attend them
for a higher number of years. Public investment therefore had a positive effect both on the
extensive and intensive margins of human capital accumulation.
Even after the Guizot law of 1833, many municipalities (especially those below 500 inhabitants)
remained without a school. Variations in schools’ presence, enrolment and literacy rates were
far from being absorbed in the mid-nineteenth century and even in the 1870s, in spite of a first
convergence between departments and districts which was already at work. The early involve-
ment of municipalities to increase enrolment and the accumulation of human capital appears
to have been an essential factor in accounting for the long-lasting variations in educational
attainment in France during the nineteenth century.
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Figure B1: Enrolment in primary schools
Source: Statistique générale de la France.
Note: All types of schools are taken into account, whether public or private.
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Table A1: Data representativeness, means and t-tests
France Municipal level sample t-test
Population 91 948 85 794 NS
Number of municipalities 105 90 ***
Percentage of population scattered 49.4 55.4 *
Average altitude - meters 300 211 ***
Surface area - hectares 1 566 1 869 ***
Percentage of municipalities with schools 71.5 60.8 ***
Primary schools per 100 municipalities 215 79 NS
Teachers with a fixed salary per 100 municipalities 48.1 51.9 NS
Teachers with an accommodation per 100 municipalities 43.6 46.8 NS
Pupils per 100 children and single people 19.9 16.5 **
Percentage of municipalities with factories 17.2 21.6 **
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Guizot, industrial and postal surveys. IGN data and Statistique générale de la France.
Notes: All figures are computed at the level of districts. The average population in each district was respectively
around 85 794 inhabitants for those belonging to the municipality level sample and around 91 948 inhabitants
for the entire France. The difference between the two is non-significant.
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Table A2: Education Summary Statistics - District level
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Percentage of municipalities with schools 68.6 23 17.8 100 355
Primary schools per 100 municipalities 95 60.6 26 753.3 357
Public schools per 100 municipalities 57.1 33.4 1.9 160.7 357
Accommodation or allowance per 100 schools 44.5 26.7 1.6 92.9 355
Paid teachers per 100 schools 49.1 27.8 2.9 105.1 350
Average schooling fees (in francs) 1.2 0.5 0.2 2.9 357
Pupils per 100 children and single people 19 13.7 2.3 54.4 351
Percentage of municipalities with schoolhouses 39.4 24.7 0 99.1 357
Schoolhouses per 100 municipalities 51.5 40.7 0 267.9 357
Schoolhouses owned per 100 municipalities 26.7 27.5 0.9 248.5 343
Schoolhouses rented per 100 municipalities 28.8 27.6 0.6 250 319
Population dispersion 50.9 27.12 2.52 89.59 355
Factories’ presence 9.46 10.05 0 81.48 355
Source: Guizot, industrial and postal surveys. IGN data and Statistique générale de la France.
Notes: All variables are at the districts level. The percentage of municipalities with at least a primary
school lied between 17.8 and 100%, with an average value of 68.6% and a standard deviation of 23. The
number of teachers provided with an accommodation or a fixed salary per 100 schools may exceed the
value of 100 since several teachers could be granted so in the same primary school. Factories’ presence
is defined as the percentage of municipalities with factories more than ten workers.
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Municipal Investment in Primary Schooling
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Figure B2: Height of military conscripts
Source: Military data on conscripts from [Aron et al., 1972].
Notes: In the first sub-figure, all numbers indicate lower bounds for the intervals except the first one
which indicates that all conscripts below the minimum height of 1.598 meters are gathered in the
first interval.
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Figure B3: High heights among conscripts and municipal investment primary schooling
Source: Guizot survey and military data on conscripts from [Aron et al., 1972].
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Description of data used in the estimations
Municipal-level estimations - controls
• Demographic and geographic municipal controls : population (in 1801, 1806, 1821, 1826,
1831), population dispersion, altitude, surface area of municipalities
• Economic municipal controls : presence of a factory, number of industrial workers, value
of taxes on industrial production, number of engines
• District level controls : number of children and single people
• Department level controls : number of presbyteries, length of water and roads communica-
tion networks, price of wheat in 1799, amount of taxes on doors and windows, production
of cereals, life expectancy at birth
District-level estimations - controls
• District level controls : population (in 1801, 1806, 1821, 1826, 1831), average population
dispersion within municipalities, average altitude and surface area of municipalities, per-
centage of municipalities with factories, number of industrial workers, value of taxes on
industrial production, number of engines, number of children and single people, district
with prefecture
• Department level controls : same as for the municipal-level estimations
School-level estimations - controls
All the controls are the same as for the municipal-level-estimations, adding controls at the
school level: number of subjects, coeducation, boarding school, admission age, schooling length,
level of teachers’ certification, persons at charge for teachers, progress by pupils, presence of
textbooks, books in sufficient amount.
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Figure B4: High heights among conscripts and development indicators
Source: Military data on conscripts from [Aron et al., 1972]. See main text for other indicators.
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Table A3: Too small conscripts and primary schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentage of Primary schools Public schools Accommodation Paid teachers Enrolment
municipalities with per 100 municipalities per 100 municipalities or allowance per per 100 schools
primary schools 100 schools
Too small conscripts -1.080*** -1.548*** -0.907** -0.415 0.012 -0.343***
(-4.370) (-3.505) (-2.484) (-1.127) (0.042) (-2.691)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department clusters 82 82 82 82 82 82
Observations 271 266 273 271 267 270
R2 0.569 0.514 0.698 0.591 0.591 0.682
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: too small conscripts refers to the number of percentage of examined 20 years old boys too small to fulfil military duties, that is to say less than 1.57 meters.
Its standard deviation is of 5.8.
Table A4: Heights of conscripts and primary schooling. Municipal level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Primary School Fixed salary Salary amount Accommodation Classroom Other salary Other salary amount
High heights among 0.017*** 0.013*** 2.989** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 1.716***
conscripts (3.659) (3.616) (2.209) (3.162) (4.868) (2.924) (3.621)
Department wealth controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 75 75 75 75 75 72 75
Observations 6324 6324 6324 6324 6324 3559 6324
R2 0.302 0.297 0.308 0.246 0.262 0.302 0.150
High heights among 0.017*** 0.012*** 1.140 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.008 2.309***
conscripts (3.041) (2.665) (0.627) (5.670) (3.339) (1.053) (2.952)
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 75 75 75 75 75 72 75
Observations 6324 6324 6324 6324 6324 3559 6324
R2 0.371 0.371 0.393 0.305 0.315 0.319 0.157
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: high heights among conscripts refers to the percentage of conscripts in each district taller than national mean. Primary school, Fixed salary, Accommodation and Other salary are
all dummy variables taking value one if there was at least one primary school in the given municipality, at least one teacher paid by this municipality, at least one teacher provided with an
accommodation, at least one with another municipal occupation. The Salary amount and Other salary amount correspond to the teachers’ annual wages in francs.
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Table A5: Heights of conscripts and schoolhouses. District level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentage of municipalities Schoolhouses per Schoolhouses owned per Schoolhouses rented per
with schoolhouses 100 municipalities 100 municipalities 100 municipalities
High heights among 0.598* 1.419*** 1.057*** 0.311
conscripts (1.794) (4.410) (4.465) (1.133)
Population dispersion -0.207** -0.506*** -0.289*** -0.243**
(-2.194) (-4.194) (-2.836) (-2.172)
Factories presence 0.153 0.699*** 0.480*** 0.316*
(1.216) (3.103) (3.690) (1.799)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department clusters 74 73 74 74
Observations 249 243 241 225
R2 0.477 0.588 0.599 0.354
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: high heights among conscripts refers to the percentage of conscripts in each district taller than national mean. Population dispersion is the percentage of population
which is reported scattered in the Postal Survey, based on a contiguity criterion [Roncayolo, 1987]. Factories’ presence is the percentage of municipalities in which at least
one factory more than ten workers was located. The Percentage of municipalities with schoolhouses corresponds to municipalities in which the number of schoolhouses was
evaluated as sufficient in the Guizot survey, meaning that all teachers in the municipality at stake could benefit from such premises.
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Figure B5: Deciles of the percentage of high heights among conscripts and primary schooling.
Municipality level
Source: Military data on conscripts from [Aron et al., 1972], Guizot survey.
Notes: The deciles are related to the percentage of high heights among conscripts. It means that the
percentage of municipalities where at least one primary school was present or a teacher was paid,
... is given for every decile of the percentage of high heights. For example, a primary schools was
present in around 80% of the municipalities in districts belonging to the top decile of high heights.
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Schooling Fees and Enrolment Rates
Table A6: Descriptive statistics, schooling fees and wages
Average value
Schooling fees (districts) 1.21 Monthly
Schooling fees (municipalities) 0.96 Monthly
Minimum schooling fees (municipalities) 0.9 Monthly
Industrial male workers 1.97 Daily
Industrial female workers 0.93 Daily
Industrial child workers 0.65 Daily
Agricultural male day-worker 1.4 Daily
Agricultural female day-worker 0.9 Daily
Agricultural child day-worker 0.6 Daily
Source: Guizot, industrial and agricultural surveys.
Notes: The average schooling fees amount at the district level was 1.21 francs.
This corresponds to what was paid to teachers each months by families so that
their children could attend primary schools.
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Table A7: Subsidised primary schools and schooling fees - District level
Average schooling fees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percentage of municipalities -0.006*** – – – –
with primary schools (-3.628)
Public schools per – -0.005*** – – –
100 municipalities (-3.607)
Percentage of public schools – – -0.007*** – –
(-4.066)
Paid teachers per 100 schools – – – -0.004*** –
(-3.225)
Accommodation or allowance – – – – -0.001
per 100 schools (-1.016)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 74 74 74 74 74
Observations 247 249 249 244 247
R2 0.718 0.721 0.728 0.718 0.701
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Average schooling fees are defined in francs.
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In Table A8, I use the 1851 Census to approximate the number of children in each district in
1833. To do so, I take the number of pupils between 5 and 15 years old within departments.
I consider these age bounds since, in 87% of the cases, the admission age reported in the data
coming from the Guizot survey was superior or equal to five. The length of primary instruction
was also always lower than 10 years.
Then, I take the proportion that a given district represented in the department population to
be equal to what it represented in the children population. This assumes the age distribution
between adults and children to have been the same for a department and its districts. In
districts with a more urban and young population that the average department level, the two
distributions may have differed. However, there is a correlation of 0.97 between the number
of children and single people in 1831 and the approximated number of children in 1851. This
tends to confirm that the computation is actually quite close to the real number of children
within districts. This measure has a mean of 24.6%, with a median enrolment value of 19%.
Table A8: Schooling fees and enrolment rates - District level
Pupils per 100 children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average schooling fees -8.806*** -6.637*** -5.044*** -4.699***
(-5.875) (-3.806) (-3.473) (-2.798)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ratio of public schools No Yes No Yes
Department wealth controls No No Yes Yes
Department clusters 81 81 74 74
Observations 266 266 245 245
R2 0.795 0.798 0.872 0.872
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Average schooling fees are defined in francs.
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Table A9: Population Deciles - Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
First decile 177.54 43.12 30 239 809
Second decile 287.37 27.07 240 331 812
Third decile 376.25 26.84 332 420 800
Fourth decile 466.11 26.83 421 512 809
Fifth decile 569.95 35.07 513 631 806
Sixth decile 702.37 41.63 632 777 804
Seventh decile 869.04 56 778 975 805
Eighth decile 1114.38 89.7 976 1283 808
Ninth decile 1548.59 185.12 1284 1935 805
Tenth decile 3791.35 4749.73 1938 75895 806
Source: Statistique générale de la France.
Notes: The average municipal population in the first population
decile was 178 inhabitants. The minimum value was 30 inhabi-
tants and the maximum 239 inhabitants. The standard deviation
was around 43.
Table A10: Minimum schooling fees and enrolment. Municipality level
Dependent variable : Pupils per 100 inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Population Population Population Population Population Population Population Population Population
≤631 (Med) ≤631 ≤631 ≥631 ≥631 ≥631 ≤2 000 ≤2 000 ≤2 000
Minimum schooling fees -0.033*** -0.011 -0.010 -0.022*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.030*** -0.006 -0.006*
(-3.944) (-1.462) (-1.480) (-7.599) (-3.197) (-3.733) (-6.413) (-1.665) (-1.718)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department wealth controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Department fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
District clusters 52 45 52 70 61 70 68 59 68
Observations 1152 1021 1152 1184 971 1184 2170 1853 2170
R2 0.503 0.562 0.556 0.739 0.718 0.781 0.605 0.640 0.661
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: The minimum level of fees is defines in cents of franc.
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Public Education, Teaching Conditions and Human Capital Accumu-
lation
Table A11: Teaching certificates and public primary schooling - Logit, odds-ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subsidised school Fixed salary Accommodation Classroom Other municipal occupation
First-degree certificate 0.775 2.720** 1.787 1.408 2.061*
(-0.397) (2.053) (1.509) (0.681) (1.889)
Second-degree certificate 2.109*** 2.662*** 2.029*** 1.550** 1.774***
(3.927) (5.511) (3.934) (2.331) (3.166)
Third-degree certificate 1.726*** 1.585*** 1.118 1.160 1.662***
(3.595) (3.105) (0.726) (0.931) (3.155)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 74 74 73 73 74
Observations 4052 4098 3604 3604 4076
Pseudo-R2 0.345 0.243 0.272 0.295 0.287
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Certification degrees’ impact is evaluated compared to the situation in which the teacher had no certificate. The salary amount is in francs per
year.
Table A12: Public primary schooling and teaching characteristics - Logit, odds-ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order Discipline Work Teaching Progress
Subsidised school 1.415** 1.455** 1.671*** 1.543*** 1.341***
(2.107) (2.408) (3.684) (3.164) (2.704)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 73 71 73 74 74
Observations 3703 3377 3371 3570 3544
Pseudo-R2 0.036 0.038 0.048 0.053 0.042
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Subsidised school is a binary variables which is equal to one if the municipality was investing
in the school at stake. Order, Discipline, Work, Teaching and Progress are all binary variables taking
the value to one when the school was controlled by the teacher for what regards order, discipline and
work, when his teaching was deemed satisfactory and when pupils were making progress.
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Table A13: Public primary schooling and teaching characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order Discipline Work Teaching Progress
Fixed salary 0.100*** – – – –
(4.200)
Salary amount – 0.035*** – – –
(3.459)
Accommodation – – 0.110*** – –
(5.326)
Classroom – – – 0.089*** –
(3.701)
Other municipal occupation – – – – 0.005
(0.200)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 74 69 73 73 74
Observations 3599 2347 3146 3146 3562
R2 0.060 0.069 0.067 0.064 0.053
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: All independent variables, except the salary amount, are binary which equal one when the
schools was provided with grants. The salary amount is defined in tens of francs to facilitate the
interpretation. Order, Discipline, Work, Teaching and Progress are all binary variables taking the
value to one when the school was controlled by the teacher for what regards order, discipline and work,
when his teaching was deemed satisfactory and when pupils were making progress.
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Table A14: Public primary schooling and teaching characteristics - Logit, odds-ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order Discipline Work Teaching Progress
Fixed salary 1.532*** – – – –
(4.121)
Salary amount – 1.200*** – – –
(3.617)
Accommodation – – 1.595*** – –
(5.322)
Classroom – – – 1.468*** –
(3.677)
Other municipal occupation – – – – 1.023
(0.215)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 74 68 73 7 74
Observations 3599 2344 3146 3146 3562
Pseudo-R2 0.046 0.053 0.051 0.049 0.041
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: All independent variables, except the salary amount, are binary which equal one when the
schools was provided with grants. The salary amount is defined in tens of francs to facilitate the
interpretation. Order, Discipline, Work, Teaching and Progress are all binary variables taking the
value to one when the school was controlled by the teacher for what regards order, discipline and work,
when his teaching was deemed satisfactory and when pupils were making progress.
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Table A15: Teachers’ characteristics and teaching certificates - Logit, odds-ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order Discipline Work Teaching Progress
First-degree certificate 1.479 1.223 1.742 5.679*** 3.874**
(0.791) (0.409) (1.130) (3.328) (2.547)
Second-degree certificate 2.497*** 2.302*** 3.395*** 4.926*** 3.585***
(4.985) (4.201) (7.034) (8.396) (7.356)
Third-degree certificate 0.880 0.835 1.093 1.784*** 1.239
(-0.833) (-1.039) (0.579) (3.538) (1.438)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 73 71 73 74 74
Observations 3787 3467 3457 3652 3621
Pseudo-R2 0.067 0.066 0.082 0.088 0.078
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Notes: Order, Discipline, Work, Teaching and Progress are all binary variables taking the value to one
when the school was controlled by the teacher for what regards order, discipline and work, when his
teaching was deemed satisfactory and when pupils were making progress. All independent variables are
binary, taking the value one if the teacher had a certificate.
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Figure B6: Public schooling and number of subjects - Histograms
Source: Guizot survey.
Notes: Each bar in the histograms represents the percentage of observations corresponding to a
given number of subjects taught. Therefore, it represents the percentage of primary schools for each
number of subject. The schools are divided between those which were granted with public subsidises
and the private ones. Each subsidy histogram is therefore compared to the same histogram of subjects
but drawn only for private schools.
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Table A16: Public education and subjects taught. Mean t-tests
Number of subjects

N Mean N Mean p-value
Private school Public school
1163 4.56 4355 4.83 0.000
No fixed salary Fixed salary
2452 4.59 3128 4.89 0.000
No accommodation Accommodation
2614 4.57 2350 5.05 0.000
No classroom Classroom
2146 4.60 2818 4.94 0.000
No other occupation Other occupation
3010 4.74 2530 4.78 NS
Source: Guizot survey.
Notes: In private schools, there were around 4.6 subjects taught against approximately
4.8 in their public counterparts. The difference between the two is significant at a
one-percent level.
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Table A17: Public education and years of schooling. Mean t-tests
Years of schooling

N Mean N Mean p-value
Private school Public school
1116 3.92 4350 5.28 0.000
No fixed salary Fixed salary
2390 4.41 3157 5.43 0.000
No accommodation Accommodation
2554 4.28 2362 5.61 0.000
No classroom Classroom
2071 4.07 2845 5.54 0.000
No other occupation Other occupation
2936 4.37 2563 5.64 0.000
Source: Guizot survey.
Notes: In private schools, pupils spent on average around 4 years at school against
approximately 5.3 years in their public counterparts. The difference between the two
is significant at a one-percent level.
Table A18: Public education and subjects. Mean t-tests
Private school Public school
N Mean N Mean p-value
Arithmetic 1166 69 4344 61 0.000
Grammar 1166 38 4344 46 0.000
Spelling 1166 35 4344 53 0.000
Geography 1166 10 4344 7 0.000
Land surveying 1166 5 4344 11 0.000
Linear drawing 1166 4 4344 8 0.000
History 1166 4 4344 3 0.058
Music 1166 2 4344 4 0.010
Source: Guizot survey.
Notes: Arithmetic was taught in around 69% of the private pri-
mary schools for which information on subjects and subsidies is
available. It was the case in 61% of the public schools. The differ-
ence between the two is significant at a one-percent level.
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Table A19: Public schooling and human capital accumulation - Logit, odds-ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Arithmetic Grammar Spelling Geography Land surveying Linear drawing History Music
Subsidised school 1.569*** 1.565*** 1.635*** 1.445 1.155 2.738** 1.824 0.708
(2.982) (3.788) (3.488) (1.379) (0.505) (2.489) (1.603) (-0.663)
Demographical and geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District clusters 70 70 70 59 63 62 49 38
Observations 3732 3732 3732 3237 3613 3621 3050 2631
Pseudo-R2 0.150 0.126 0.216 0.140 0.136 0.108 0.175 0.231
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: see main text.
Note: All subject names correspond to binary variables taking value one if the subject was taught in the primary school.
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